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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
RALPH MEIKLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, *

Case No. 940576-CA

-vPriority No. 15
REVA HUNTINGTON, as
Personal Representative *
of BILL HUNTINGTON, Deceased.
Defendant and Respondent.
*

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal
Court

of the State

of Utah, pursuant

is vested in the Supreme
to Utah Code Annotated,

section 78-2-2 (3) (j) (supp.,1992), which states:
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(j)

orders, judgments, and decrees

of any

court of

record, which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction.
Pursuant to the rule making power of the Utah Supreme Court
this matter has been designated as one to be heard by the Utah
Court of Appeals.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the respondent entitled

matter of law?

to Summary Judgment as a

The standard of review is one of determining the

correctness of the ruling of the trial court with respect to a
motion for summary judgment.

Apache Tank Lines v. Cheney,706 P.

2d 217, 220 ( Utah 1993).
2.

Must

the

appellant

assume

the

burden

of

proof

to

demonstrate negligence when the moving party provides some evidence
which might support the affirmative defense of "sudden incapacity."
The appropriate standard of review would require that all facts as
established and inferences drawn therefrom could rationally support
no

other

conclusion

than that

sought

by

the moving

party

and

therefore the appropriate standard of review is one of correction
of error since the Appellant challenges the application of the law
by the trial court. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P 2 434 (Utah 1982)
Durham v. Marqetts, 571 P 2 1332 ( Utah 1977).
3.

Sudden incapacity is an affirmative defense in any event

and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence but if
appellant presents any credible evidence or if there are inferences
which might

lawfully be drawn from the evidence presented, the

motion for summary judgment must fail as a matter of law, since the

2

standard of review is whether applicable law was applied correctly
by the trial court.
4.

When

the

State v. Pena, 869 P 2 932 (Utah 1994).
undisputed

facts

raise

an

inference

of

negligence, a motion for summary judgment, in light that inference,
should not
evidence

be granted

is marshalled

as a matter of
to support

law, whether

that

or not any

inference. Goodrich v.

Blair, 646 P.2 890 (Ariz. App. 1992).
5.

Violation of a traffic law, outside of narrowly drawn

exceptions, is deemed to be negligence per se and at the level of
summary judgment the standard of review is that of correction of
error. Goodrich v. Blair, (supra)
6.

With respect to a motion for summary judgment the burden

of proof regarding the sudden incapacity defense, which as a matter
of law resides with the appellant, does not, upon presentation of
some evidence to support it, shift to the Appellant.

Goodrich v.

Blair, 646 P.2 890 (Ariz. App. 1982).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Interpretation of the following

statues and rules will

be

determinative of the issues presented:
(1) Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that:

3

Summary judgment shall be rendered if the record demonstrates
that:
(c) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Doubts or uncertainties concerning issues
of fact properly presented, or the nature of inferences
to be drawn from the facts, are to be construed in a
light favorable to the party opposing the summary
judgment.
(2) U.S.C. 41-6-46, (1) 1953 as amended mandates that;
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.
Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive
at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and
crossing an intersection or a railroad grade crossing,
when approaching
and going around a curve, when
approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow
or winding roadway, and when special hazards exist with
respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of
weather or highway conditions.
(3) U.S.C.

41-6-53

(1) (a) 1953

pertinent part that a violation occurs
to the right", exceptions to the

as amended, provides

"[upon] failure to keep

rule are given but none are

applicable to this case.
(4) U.S.C. 41-6-69 (l)(a) 1953 as amended
A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left
upon a roadway or change lanes until the movement can be
made with reasonable safety and an appropriate signal has
been given.

4

in

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(1)
from

This case arose as a result of an automobile collision

which

appellant

brought

an

action

in

negligence

in

the

District Court for Cache County Utah; after a petition for an
interlocutory appeal from a pretrial ruling not pertinent here was
denied. Respondent brought a motion for summary judgment which was
granted and appellant appeals from the order dismissing the claims
of appellant for damages.
(2)

On October 31, 1987 the appellant and respondent, each

driving their own motor vehicles, were involved in an automobile
collision.
(3)
adverse

The collision occurred at a time when no special
conditions

of

traffic

or weather,

road

conditions

or
or

visibility were operative,
(4)

The respondent's automobile, without signaling, turned

from its lane of travel, crossed the center line and traversed into
the oncoming

lane

of

traffic, colliding

with

the

Appellant's

automobile, which had taken appropriate evasive action.
(5)
died.

Before he could be taken from the scene the respondent

Immediately prior to the collision, Appellant Ralph Meikle

noted that the respondent "-- [Appeared to be] asleep or something,
laying back in his seat."(TR. P 11 L. 1-5).
5

(6)

The respondent had a history of heart problems and had,at

some remote time, undergone an open heart surgical procedure which
involve coronary bypass, (autopsy report P.3,para.5)
(7) Three days prior to the accident, on October 28, 1987 the
respondent's doctor, Dr. David Beckstead, examined the respondent
and stated by way of affidavit ( affidavit of Dr. David Beckstead
P.2, (4) L.3), that

in

his

opinion

the

"coronary

disease

was

completely stable" and that the respondent was "asymptomatic."
(8)

Reva Huntington, the respondent's wife, supports

evidence that the respondent was asymptomatic by stating,

the

"[that

the respondent] did his normal chores around the house and ate a
good lunch.
service.
suffering

After that he decided to take his car to Logan for
[And that]

he was

from no unusual

current on his medications

conditions

at

the time he

left

and
the

house." (affidavit of Reva Huntington P.l (2), L. 2-4).
(9) The autopsy report establishes that there were "abrasions
and

broken

leg

bones"

consistent

with

the

theory

that

the

respondent braced was for impact. [Affidavit of Dr. Timothy Woods,
(P.l (3), L. 1-3)];
(10)

The appellant sustained extensive injuries to his back

and shoulders.

6

POINTS ON APPEAL
Point I:

The

Respondent,

on

the

facts

of

this

case, is

not

entitled to Summary Judgment.
Point II:

The Appellant does not have the burden of proof with

respect to the defense of "sudden incapacity."
Point III: The sudden incapacity defense is an affirmative defense
and respondent must, by marshaling all of the evidence, establish
that the facts support no other explanation or excuse

for the

unlawful conduct of respondent save "sudden incapacity."
ARGUMENTS
Point I:

The

Respondent,

on

the

facts

of

this

case, is not

entitled to Summary Judgment.
(11)

The

Trial

Court

granted

summary

judgment

on

the

insupportable finding that the respondent (Bill Huntington) having
suffered a "sudden incapacity", possibly a heart attack, while
driving his vehicle, was not negligent and therefore owed no duty
to the

appellant

Ralph

Meikle.

The

trial

court

viewed

Bill

Huntington's sudden incapacity as an unavoidable accident in that
it was

unforeseen

and

unanticipated

control.

7

and

beyond

his

conscious

(12) The Appellant contends that the Respondent, as a matter
of law, was not entitled to Summary Judgment.

The Utah Supreme

Court in WEBSTER v.SILL, 675 P. 2d 1170 (Utah 1983) observed:
"Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, summary judgment shall be rendered if the
record demonstrates that:
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of
fact properly presented, or the nature of inferences to
be drawn from the facts, are to be construed in a light
favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment,
(cases cited)
(13)

The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment in

favor of the respondent in that there are factual issues which have
not been resolved by the proceedings had to date.
Pena 869 P 2d 932 (1994).

In

State v.

The Utah Court observed that;

"For purposes of appellate review of trial court's
determination of law "correctness" means that the
appellate court decides matter for itself and does not
defer in any degree to trial judge's determination of
law.
In
the abstract, effect of a given set of facts is
question of law and thus one on which appellate court
owes no deference to trial courts determination.
(14) In Pena (supra), the Supreme Court employed the following
definition of factual issues:
"Factual questions are generally regarded as entailing
the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or
conditions happening, existing or taking place, as well
8

as the subjective,such as state of mind." Pena, supra at
P. 2d at 935 ( citing Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of
Review- Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev.
231,236 (1991)
(15)

Appellant

contends

that

the

weight

given

to

the

operative facts and the inferences which might be drawn on account
of the weight assigned are not the province of the Trial Court and
consequently, in ignoring that principle, the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the respondent.

It is still

very much an open question as to whether Bill Huntington had a
heart attack and it is further an open question, even if he did
have a heart attack, did that heart attack necessarily produce
sudden

incapacity?

There

is

a

further

unanswered

question,

assuming there was a heart attack, did it occur prior to, during or
after the accident?
(16) In the autopsy report (at page 2,para. 6 and 7 ) , there are
notations of abrasions to Huntington's hands and the presence of
broken leg bones which suggest, that Bill Huntington braced himself
for impact.

In an affidavit by Dr. Timothy Woods we find at, (P.l

para. (3), L. l-3)the following,
"Over the past three years, I have seen numerous motor
vehicle accident victims with complicated extremity
injuries. Fractures similar to those described in the
9

autopsy report of respondent Bill Huntington are commonly
seen in conscious automobile trauma victims."
(17)

Inasmuch as the Respondent was the movant for summary

judgment in this matter, the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom
Appellant.
Apache Tank

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

The Utah Supreme Court in reviewing the case of,
Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P. 2d

614

(Utah

1985)

observed:
Summary judgment should be granted with great caution in
negligence cases. Williams v. Melby, 699 P. 2d 723 (Utah
1985). Issues of negligence ordinarily present questions
of fact to be resolved by the fact finder. It is only
when the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable
conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues become
questions of law.
FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby
Insurance Co. , 594 P. 2d 1332 ( Utah 1979).
Likewise,
proximate cause is usually a factual issue and in most
circumstances will not be resolved as a matter of law.
Uniqard Insurance Co.v. City of Laverkin, 689 P. 2d 1344
( Utah 1984).
(18) It has been said that the Court should use great caution
when granting
v.UTAH

summary

judgment

TRANSIT AUTH.,671

enunciated

in a negligence

P. 2d 217

(Utah

1993).

action, HARRIS
The

standard

in Harris (supra) at P.220 is as follows;

Accordingly, summary judgment is generally improper on
the issue of negligence and only in clear-cut cases, with
the exercise of great caution, should a court take the
issue of negligence from the province of the jury.

10

(19)

The appellant

opposed

summary

judgment

because the

respondent had failed to meet its burden necessary to establish
that the Respondent was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of
law.

The

questions

as

to

whether

Bill

Huntington

lost

consciousness at or prior to the time of the accident and questions
as to why Bill Huntington was unconscious if, in fact, he was, or
if he had merely fallen "asleep or something" (TR. P. 11, L. 3-5)
were

sharply

controverted

as

was

the

contention

that

the

respondent, in the accident sequence, had not violated Utah Law
(20) As stated in WYCALIS v.GUARDIAN TITLE, 780 P.2d 821,824
(Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 789,P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). The court
held that;
When determining if summary judgment is proper, we view
all relevant facts, including all inferences arising from
the facts, in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.
Point II: The Appellant does not have the burden of proof on the
Respondent's "sudden incapacity defense."
(21)

In a hearing on April 12, 1994, at the trial level the

residing judge observed; (TR. P7 L.6)
"
the issue is that we'll say this man was unconscious
just prior to the accident. Can an unconscious man be
guilty of negligence for violation (pause) for what
appears to be a violation of the statute or do you have
to prove the negligence which caused him to be
unconscious? It seems to me that the burden of proof may
11

be upon you to say he was in that condition as a result
of negligence."
(22)
Judge

The appellant contends that,the opinion of the Trial

notwithstanding,

Appellant

with

respect

the

burden

to the

of

proof

Respondent's

did

not

"sudden

shift

to

incapacity

defense" upon the presentment of some evidence that the Respondent
was unconscious; certainly driving while fatigued or inattentive
might well support a finding of negligence.
(23)

The California Court of Appeals in Ford v. Carew &

English, 89 Cal . App. 2d 199, 200 P. 2d 828 at 831 (1949) observed:
Appellant relies greatly on Waters v. Pacific Coast
Dairy, Inc., supra, 55 Cal. App. 2d 789, 131 P 2d 588,
for her contention that respondent failed to meet the
burden placed upon them by the res ipsa doctrine.
In
that case a truck driver was on the wrong side of the
highway when he struck the victim. This violation of the
Vehicle Code raised an inference of negligence. The jury
found for appellant, and on appeal the judgment was
affirmed.
Appellant here quotes the opinion in the
Waters case as though it were authority for the
proposition that as a matter of law respondents there
failed to dispel the presumption of negligence. Actually
the decision in the Waters case was that it was for the
jury to determine whether or not the presumption had been
dispelled, and that the jury found that it had not been
dispelled.
In that case the driver claimed that the
accident was caused by his becoming unconscious at the
wheel. At first he examined him immediately and for some
time after the accident assured him his heart was all
right. He was positive he did not go to sleep, and was
equally positive that he had become unconscious. But the
respondents made no explanation of what could have caused
him to become unconscious, the burden of showing which
the court held to be on the respondents. The court held
12

that both the question of whether the driver was telling
the truth as to the cause of the accident and whether the
proof of respondents as to the cause of the attack, if he
had one, and whether such attack could have been
anticipated, overcame the presumption raised by the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, were questions of fact for
the jury.
(24)
that

The undisputed facts in the instant case established

the Respondent, Bill Huntington, turned

opposing

lanes

causing injury.

of

traffic

and struck

the

onto

and

crossed

Appellant's

vehicle

These violations of Utah Law raise an inference of

negligence and cast upon the Respondent the burden of proof, under
the res ipsa doctrine, to dispel

the presumption of negligence

attaching to a finding of violation of law.
The Arizona Court of Appeals in Goodrich v. Blair, 646 P.2 ed 890
at 892 ( Ariz. App. 1982) observed:
The sole defense to Blair's liability at trial was that
Mr. Blair had suffered from a "sudden incapacity" and
was, therefore, not liable for his conduct which would
otherwise be negligent per se. Appellants contended that
the sudden incapacity defense was taken on both sides of
the issue, and the matter was submitted to the jury under
the instruction in question on this appeal which we quote
"However, the driver of an automobile is not negligent
when he becomes suddenly stricken by an unforseen cause
which makes him lose control of his automobile even if
then violates a statute". For this defense to apply, you
must find from the evidence that:(l) Mr. Blair lost
control of his automobile because of some physical
incapacity; and, (2) The physical incapacity, which
caused Mr. Blair to lose control of his automobile, was
of the kind that he should not reasonably foresee would
occur at that time.
13

(25) The respondent is unable to apply this two pronged test
to the case at hand because it cannot be established, as a matter
of

law, that

the operator

of the motor

vehicle

suffered

some

physical incapacity nor can it be established by the respondent
that the physical incapacity was the kind that the operator of the
motor vehicle should not have reasonably

foreseen as likely to

occur at the time relevant to this case.
(26) The instant prior to impact the appellant recalled," I
think

he

(respondent

Bill

Huntington)

was

either

asleep

whatever, laying back in the seat." (TR. P.11, L. 3-5)

or
This

statement became a source of speculation by the respondent (and by
the Trial Judge) (TR. P.7, L. 6) that the respondent had suffered
a heart attack.

Conversley, just prior to the accident, on October

28,1987 the respondent was examined by his physician, Dr. David
Beckstead and was found to be healthy and showing no indication
that a heart attack was imminent.

(affidavit of Dr.

Beckstead P.2,(4),L.3).
(27)

Likewise,

the autopsy

contentions of respondent.

report

does not

support

the

The report at page 3 para.5 states;

No hemorrhage is seen. The chambers and valves bear the
usual size and positional relationships with no evidence
of out-flow obstruction.

14

(28)

The death certificate concludes that the immediate cause

of Respondent's death was from of injuries sustained in an accident
wherein the decedent suffered multiple injuries to his torso and
legs.

The

Death

Certificate

conditions-contributing
cause given

also

noted

other

to death, but not related

as "Atherosclerotic

autopsy report, therefore, cannot

Cardiovascular
be construed

significant
to

immediate

Disease."
as

The

establishing

heart attack, it only establishes a condition, which might relate
to a heart attack, and explain such an attack, if one occurred. The
autopsy report is not sworn to nor was any Affidavit in support of
the Autopsy Report filed with the trial court.
(29) The autopsy report, at p. 5 para 2, without foundation,
offers the conjecture that
"Investigation indicates that the decedent apparently
lost consciousness prior to the accident and failed to
take evasive action."
Appellant can find no support in the record for this gratuitous
afterthought.
(30) The respondent has the burden of proof to show that the
accident resulted from a sudden
consciousness
unforeseen.

and

control

illness or attack

and loss of

and that such was unanticipated

and

Nothing in the record establishes that contention, by

competent evidences, even as a prima facia matter.
15

(31) The issues of negligence, the origins of the physical
incapacity, if any, and whether the alleged incapacity could have
been foreseen are questions of fact for the jury.
(32)

Conversely

it is undisputed,

at

this point

in the

litigation, that the Respondent, Bill Huntington, drove on the
wrong

side

of

the

road

in violation

of

statue

accident resulting in injury to the Appellant.

and

caused

an

Those undisputed

facts raise an inference that the respondent was negligent and
indeed, those facts, establish negligence, per se; see Ford v.
Carew and English, (supra at P 831);

Wherein the nuances of the

doctrine of negligence per se are more fully explored.
(33)

As the case of REES v.ALBERTSON, 587 P. 2d 130

points

out;
"
questions relating to negligence and proximate
cause are generally for the fact-trier, court or jury to
determine.
A party should not be deprived of the
privilege of having such an adjudication on his claims
unless it appears that even upon the facts claimed by him
he could not establish a doubt about the matter, it
should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go
to trial ."
Point III: The sudden incapacity defense is an affirmative defense
and respondent must, by marshaling all of the evidence, establish
that no reasonable view of the facts support any other explanation
for the event than sudden incapacity.
16

(34) The

sudden

incapacity

Respondent suffered some sudden

defense

requires

that

the

and unforseen episode and

it's

rapid onset occurred while he was driving, resulting in incapacity
which caused him to become unable to control his vehicle.

These

facts, if found, in the minds of the jury, must still negate all
negligence and any duty owed to the appellant; in essence the jury
must find the event to be an unavoidable accident.'
(35) It is the appellant's

contention that the Respondent

cannot, by marshaling of the available evidence, sustain the burden
of proof

to a point where

trial

is

not

required.

As in

any

affirmative defense, "sudden incapacity"

must be proved by the

proponent, and

judgment, proved

in a motion

for summary

to a

veritable certainty.
(36)

The

respondent

does

not

enjoy,

either

by

judicial

decision, or as a consequence of the law with respect to the weight
of evidence, sufficient support to establish that the Respondent
suffered an unanticipated heart attack to the point of incapacity.

(37)

In summary, all available evidence indicated that the

physical condition of Bill Huntington, was sound. The Respondent's
But see cases holding that the giving of a jury instruction
on unavoidable accident is error.
17

doctor as well as his wife provide this evidence by stating that
Respondent manifested, just prior to the accident, no symptoms of
illness.
(38) Respondent presents no evidence that Mr. Huntington had
suffered from symptoms or relevant heart problems since the time of
his

surgery

nor

that

he

was,

at

any

pertinent

juncture,

experiencing relapse or renewal of the cardiac disease diagnosed
and treated at a remote time in his life.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant

respectfully

submits that the Respondent has

failed, as a matter of law, to meet the burden necessary to enjoy
a grant of Summary Judgment because there remain genuine issues of
fact which should be resolved

by a jury upon a trial had on the

merits.
Respectfully

litted this
submj

LT^ day of

A.Hl^La
Attorney

brmeikle.brf
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APPENDIX

41-6-46

ARTICLE 6
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds
at certain locations — Prima facie speed limits —
Rulemaking — Emergency power of the governor.
( D A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and
potential hazards then existing, including when:
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing;
(b) approaching and going around a curve;
(c) approaching a hill crest;
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and
(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, or
highway conditions.
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (5) and Sections
41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful:
(a) until January 1, 1993, 20 miles per hour when passing a school
building or its grounds during school recess or while children are going to
or leaving school during opening or closing hours unless a physical barrier prevents access to the highway from the school building or its
grounds;
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district;
(c) 65 miles per hour on highways where this speed limit does not
impair the ability of the state to qualify for federal highway funds; and
(d) 55 miles per hour in other locations.
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any speed in excess of the limits
provided in Subsection (2) is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful.
(4) The Transportation Commission shall make rules in accordance with
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, governing size
and location of physical barriers provided for in Subsection (2).
(5) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change
the speed limits on the highways of the state.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-46, enacted by L.
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 45;
1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 1; 1991, ch. 44, § 1;
1992, ch. 91, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1978
(2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1 repealed former § 41-6-46,
as last amended by L. 1978, ch. 34, § 1, relating to speed regulations, and enacted present
§ 41-6-46.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, designated the
former second sentence of the introductory
paragraph of Subsection (2) as present Subsection (3), rewrote Subsection (2)(a), added Subsection (4), redesignated former Subsection (3)
as present Subsection (5), and made corre-

sponding reference changes and changes in
punctuation and style throughout the section.
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, added "until January 1, 1993" at the beginning of Subsection (2)(a); added the exception at the beginning of Subsection (3); and
made a stylistic change.
Legislative Intent. — Laws 1987 (1st S.S.),
ch. 1, § 2 states the legislative intent that all
sections of the Utah highways that qualify under § 41-6-46(2)(c) for the 65 miles per hour
speed limit be posted at 65, subject to the provisions of §§ 41-6-47 and 41-6-48 regarding reasonable and safe speed limits.
Cross-References. — Municipal regulations, § 10-8-30.
Reckless driving, § 41-6-45.
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41-6-53

MOTOR VEHICLES

ARTICLE 7
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING
ON RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY,
OVERTAKING, PASSING AND
OTHER RULES OF
THE ROAD
41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway
— Exceptions.
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be operated upon the
right half of the roadway, except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction under the rules governing that movement;
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the
center of the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right-of-way to all
vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions
of the highway within a distance constituting an immediate hazard;
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the
applicable rules; or
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic.
(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of
traffic under the existing conditions shall be operated in the right-hand lane
then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or
edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left turn at an
intersection or into a private road or driveway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 43; C. 1943,
57-7-120; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 14; 1987, ch. 138, § 52.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
trians might pass either or both ways had the
right to relax his vigilance and was not required to do more than to maintain such lookout as would prevent his colliding or coming in
contact with anyone on his side of street. Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186
P. 439 (1919).

ANALYSIS

Backing.
Bicycle and truck.
Effect of passing from right to center.
"Half of the roadway" construed.
Instructions.
Negligence.
Presumptions.
Question for jury.
Violation as evidence of negligence.
Cited.
Backing.
Statutes requiring that vehicles keep to
right have no applicability to backing. Naisbitt
v. Eggett, 5 Utah 2d 5, 295 P.2d 832 (1956).
Bicycle and truck.
The driver of a truck who was on right side
of street and was not on, near to, or approaching a crossing where both vehicles and pedes-

Effect of passing from right to center.
While in case a street or highway is not used
by others one may drive on any part thereof,
yet, when a motorist or bicyclist passes from
right to left of the center of the street, he loses
some of his rights, and he may not be heard to
complain of the conduct of those who are on the
proper side of street to the same extent as
though he also were on the proper side. Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186
P. 439 (1919).
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries
sustained as result of collision with automobile
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41-6-68

MOTOR VEHICLES

41-6-68, Moving a vehicle — Safety.
A person may not move a vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked until
the movement may be made with reasonable safety.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 55; C. 1943,
57-7-132; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 67.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Evidence sufficient
In action for damages arising out of collision
between motorcycle and truck, evidence was
sufficient to support jury's finding that defendant, in violation of this section, moved his

truck onto highway, from point where truck
was parked on shoulder of highway, before
such movement could be made with reasonable
safety. Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 390, 216
P.2d 640 (1950).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 282.

C.J.S. — 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 334.
Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=» 173(8).

41-6-69. Turning or changing lanes — Safety — Signals —
Stopping or sudden decrease in speed — Signal
flashing — Where prohibited.
(1) (a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until the movement can be made with reasonable
safety and an appropriate signal has been given.
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall be
given continuously for at least the last three seconds preceding the beginning of the turn or change.
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal to the operator of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give a signal.
(3) The signals required on vehicles by Section 41-6-70 may not be flashed
on one side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do pass" to
operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear, or flashed on one side
only of a parked vehicle except as necessary to comply with this section.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 56; C. 1943,
57-7-133; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 96,

§ 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 24; 1978, ch. 33, § 18;
1987, ch. 138, § 68.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

~

i .i ,.

ANALYSIS
i-

position on the highway without signaling was
contributory negligence was question for jury

SSS^tfEE-M. safety."

"-J- *»f ^ f l ^ i K S S ^ f

Effect of infant's capacity upon statutory duty.
Pedestrians.
Question for jury.
Stopping or suddenly decreasing speed.
^ lte "Contributory negligence.
Whether decedent's turn from an improper

& Stora

*e-Inc" 4 5 1 F 2 d 3 1 9 ( 1 0 t h C,r' 1 9 m
Determination of "reasonable safety."
p a c t s m a y ^ ^ c\ear a n ( j indisputable that
i t m a y ^ 8ai( j ^ a m a t ter of law that turn
could not be made "with reasonable safety,"
and that defendant's act in turning was, as a
matter of law, the sole proximate cause of the
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Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Time for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran

148

from the date of notice of entry of such judg.
ment, rather than from the date of judgment
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d».
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel

****** C o r P v
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
J P W
Enters
> Inc - v- N a e f ' 6 0 4 R 2 d m
( U t a h 1979) K a t z v
>
- Herce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
^55

H

*f ^ to g * ve " o t i c e °ff a P P l i c a t l o n f d*'
ault
f
^ ^ ^ A w ^ e o n 0 ^ o l s r e q u i r e d only
b
? custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134.

c ! X s . - 49 CJ.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to Hability against defaulting defendant. 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

f

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
>ther relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
iction as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
leemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supportig and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set

w

JUDICIAL CODE

gerve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities
to the associate chief justice as consistent with law.

78-2a-2

(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1994

1990

78-2-3.
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6.

Repealed.

1971, 1981

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
~(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
uii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of
record holding a statute of the United States or
this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah
Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does
not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders,
judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
Df Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, extent:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of
an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas;
and
(f) those matters described in Subsections
(3)(a) through (d).
in
K 4 5 ) The Supreme Court has sole discretion
nting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
• the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
\ Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
\\t hv the Court of AnDeals under Subsection (3)(b).

Repealed.

1986

78-2-4.

Supreme Court — Rulemaking, j u d g e s
pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for use in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the U t a h Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
the practice of law.
1986
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be established by the appellate court administrator, and
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court.
1986

78-2-7.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance
and services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986, 1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF A P P E A L S
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions
— Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal.
1986
78-2a-2.

Number of j u d g e s — Terms — Functions — Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in J a n u a r y , next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
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Pursuant to the authority vested in-this Courts this case
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to
that Court. The address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.
Geoffrey J. Butler
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described below. There is a vertically oriented 27 cm scar in the inner aspect of the
right calf. No tattoos are seen. Examination of the feet reveals no abnormalities.
The back, anus, and
uncircumcised.

genitalia

are without

injuries

or abnormalities.

The penis is

EVIDENCE OF INJURY
MULTIPLE BLUNT FORCE INJURIES:
Examination of the face reveals multiple lacerations and abrasions. There is a small
area of abrasion just above the left eyebrow with a small area of abrasion on the left
upper eyelid. There is a horizontally oriented laceration measuring 7 x 2 cm with scant
bleeding in the surrounding tissues. This is oriented over the bridge of the nose
extending from the right cheek onto the left cheek. On the lateral right cheek are
areas of abrasion with minimal bleeding. Examination of the chin reveals a 1 x 0.6 cm
laceration with minimal bleeding. There are abrasions on the chin and proximal portions
of the right jaw. Internal examination of the head reveals no evidence of significant
subgaleal contusion, skull fracture, or internal injury to the brain or surrounding
structures.
External examination of the chest reveals faint irregular contusion involving central
portions of the chest bilaterally in an area 26 x 24 cm maximally. Over the sternum and
upper right chest are irregular areas of abrasion, some of which have a patterning
consistent with the weave of the decedent's religious garments. Abrasions measure to 5
x 6 cm in maximal dimensions. Internal examination of the chest reveals hemorrhage in
the subcutaneous tissues as well as extensive rib fracturing with ribs 1 through 10
fractured anteriorly on the right side and ribs 1 through 9 fractured anteriorly on the
left side. Posterior rib fractures involving the right first through fifth ribs are
present and the third left rib. There are bilateral hemothoraces with 800 cc of blood
on the right side and 650 cc of blood on the left side. Both lungs are collapsed and
atelectatic in appearance. Examination of the mediastinal structures reveals a complete
transection of the aorta in the region of the posterior arch of the aorta. Examination
of the spinal column reveals a forward displacement of the seventh cervical vertebra
with a small amount of surrounding hemorrhage. There is a separation fracture of the
fourth and fifth thoracic vertebra without transection of the spinal cord. There is
however, epidural and subdural bleeding in the surrounding thoracic spinal cord.
Examination of the abdomen externally reveals a tense and tympanic abdomen with multiple
irregular areas of abrasion seen in the lower abdomen bilaterally and in the right upper
quadrant.
Abrasion measure to 4 x 2 cm maximally.
Internal examination of the
abdominal cavity reveals approximately 50 cc of blood within the lower pelvic region.
There is a hepatic laceration oriented in the sagittal plane causing partial separation
of the right and left lobes of the liver. This laceration measures 8 cm in maximal
length and 3 cm in maximal depth.
The spleen has multiple irregular lacerations
measuring to 10 x 3 cm maximally.
There is retroperitoneal bleeding in the lower
abdomen bilaterally.
Bilateral sacroiliac joint fractures are present as well as a
fracture of the pubic ramus, just to the right of the midline.
Examination of the upper extremities reveals extensive contusion and crepitance of the
dorsal aspects of the hands bilaterally. A 2 cm laceration is on the posterior aspect
of the right index finger. No underlying fractures are detected.
The lower extremities are remarkable for fractures and lacerations.

The right leg has a
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fracture of the femur at a point 65 cm above the right heel. This is a comminuted
fracture without perforation of the overlying skin.
Examination of the right knee
reveals a horizontally oriented 16 x 3 cm laceration. There is minimal bleeding around
the edges of the wound. There are abrasions on the right shin measuring to 8 x 3 cm
maximally. Examination of the left leg reveals a fracture of the femur at a point 64 cm
above the level of the left heel. A 2 x 1 cm laceration is seen on the anterior aspect
of the left thigh overlying the region of fracture. On the left shin is a vertically
oriented 9 x 2 cm laceration with a vertically trailing abrasion proceding upwards to
the knee with overall dimensions of 20 x 2 cm. Multiple irregular abrasions are seen on
the medial aspect of the left shin measuring to 15 x 11 cm maximally. The posterior
aspect of the left thigh has an 8 x 2 cm laceration with a surrounding area of abrasion
10 x 9 cm.
No fractures of the tibias or fibulas are detected on the lower
extremities.
INTERNAL EXAMINATION
BODY CAVITIES: The body is opened by the usual thoracoabdominal, Y-shaped incision and
the chest plate is removed. There are hemothoraces and hemoperitoneum as previously
described. Adhesions are present in the pleural cavities between the base of the lungs
and the diaphragm.
Dense adhesions are present in the mediastinal structures with the
pericardium adhesed to the surface of the heart. All body organs are present in normal
and anatomical position. The subcutaneous fat layer of the abdominal wall is 3 cm thick.
HEAD: (Central Nervous System). The brain weighs 1500 grams. The scalp is reflected.
The calvarium of the skull is partially removed. The dura mater and falx cerebri are
intact. There are no epidural or subdural hemorrhages present. The leptomeninges are
thin and delicate. The cerebral hemispheres are symmetrical. The structures at the
base of the brain, including cranial nerves and blood vessels are intact.
Coronal
sections through the cerebral hemispheres reveal no lesions.
Transverse sections
through the brain stem and cerebellum are unremarkable. Examination of the spinal cord
reveals subdural and epidural hemorrhage as previously described in the thoracic region.
NECK:
Examination of the soft tissues of the neck, including strap muscles, thyroid
gland and large vessels, reveal no abnormalities. The hyoid bone and larynx are intact.
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM: The heart weighs 620 grams. The pericardial surfaces have dense
adhesions with essential elimination of the pericardial space.
Examination of the
subpericardial tissues reveals numerous coronary artery by-pass grafts in place. No
thrombosis or other occlusion of the grafts is detected. Examination of the coronary
arteries reveals right predominent pattern with extensive atherosclerosis with almost
complete occlusion seen in the right and left coronary arterial systems. Sectioning of
the myocardium reveals focal tan-gray scar tissue in the anterior left ventricular
wall.
No hemorrhage is seen.
The chambers and valves bear the usual size and
positional relationships with no evidence of out-flow obstruction. The aorta and its
major branches arise normally and are remarkable for calcific atherosclerosis throughout
the thoracic and abdominal aorta. There is injury as previously described. The vena
cava and its major tributaries return to the heart in the usual distribution and are
free of thrombi.
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM: The lungs weigh 420 and 350 grams, right and left, respectively.
The lungs are collapsed bilaterally.
Examination of the pleural surfaces reveals
wrinkled pleural surfaces with extensive anthracotic pigment staining bilaterally.
There are adhesions in the inferior surfaces of the lungs bilaterally. The cut surfaces
of the lungs have mild to moderate emphysema apically. No consolidations or other focal
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PATHOLOGIC DIAGNOSES:
I.

II.

III.

Multiple injuries.
A. Multiple fractures of ribs, spinal column, sacroiliac joints, pubis, and
femurs.
B. Aortic transection.
1. Bilateral hemothoraces.
C. Multiple lacerations and abrasions of external surfaces.
0, Hepatic splenic laceration.
Atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.
A. Status post coronary artery by-pass grafting for severe coronary artery
atherosclerosis.
Fatty metamorphosis and early cirrhosis of liver.

OPINION:
This 70-year-old white male, Bill Huntington, died as a result of multiple
injuries received when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Contributory to the
accident is severe atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. Investigation indicates that
the decedent apparently lost consciousness prior to the accident and failed to take any
evasive action.
MANNER OF DEATH:

Accident.

Todd C. Grey, M.D.
Assistant Medical Examiner
TCG/pgs
11/17/87

4.

Mr. Huntington came in for his last visit to me on

October 28, 1987, at which time his coronary artery disease was
completely stable and Mr. Huntington was asymptomatic.

I advised

him to continue taking his prescribed medications and return in
two months.
5.

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Huntington had no

reason to anticipate that he might suffer a heart attack while
driving his vehicle.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF REVA HUNTINGTON

RALPH MEIKLE,
Plaintiff,
vs,
REVA HUNTINGTON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
BILL HUNTINGTON, Deceased,
Defendant.

Civil No. 910000792

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE

ss.

COMES NOW Reva Huntington, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says:

1987,

1.

She is the widow of Bill Huntington.

2.

She was with him during the morning of October 31,

at which time he did normal chores around the house and ate

a good lunch.
for service.

After that, he decided to take his car to Logan

rr

SHIPPED MAR t 5 ffif
A. W. Lauritzen
Attorney for Plaintiff
610 North Main
P. 0. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-3391
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

RALPH MEIKLE,
AFFIDAVIT OF

Plaintiff,

TIMOTHY W. V700DS, M.D.

VS.

Case No. 910000792

BILL HUNTINGTON, et. aL.,

PI

Defendants.

STATE OF TEXAS

)

COUNTY OF BEXAR

)

T i m o t h y W. W o o d s , M . D . ,

1.

as

foLlows:

I am a p h y s i c i a n d u l y q u a l i f i e d and l i c e n s e d t o

m e d i c i n e i n t h e S t a t e of
2.
Center,

d e p o s e s and s t a t e s

I

am a

Utah.

surgeon

practicing

a l e v e l - o n e trauma c e n t e r ,

3.

Over

the

past

at

Brooke

i n San A n t o n i o ,

3 years,

I have

seen

Army

report

Fractures
of

Defendant

similar
Bill

c o n s c i o u s automobile trauma

to

those

Huntington
victims.

described
are

Medical

Texas.
numerous

v e h i c l e a c c i d e n t victims with complicated extremity
4.

practice

motor

injuries.
in

the

commonly

autopsy
seen

in

1

m e , over Mr. Meikle's

2

was a s l e e p , as Mr. Meikle

3

Mr. Meikle

4

he w a s "

6

THE COURT:

7

asleep?

8

what

9

negligence.

13

if he was asleep?

What

the slumped

if he was

over p a r t , but

That's a good case

for

Well, Your Honor, it depends on what

THE C O U R T :

14

like

Asleep or whatever.

I don't know about

the circumstances

place

"It looked

Asleep or whatever.

M S . ROTH:

12

(Pause-)

—

MR. LAURITZEN:

11

thought he was?

says -- what did he say?

5

10

signature, what if in fact he

were.
I know, but that's a good

starting

for arguing a case of negligence.
M S . ROTH:

15

on what

caused

16

affidavit

17

had b r e a k f a s t .

If there was some -- it would
that.

His wife has testified

that it was a normal morning.

18

THE COURT:

19

M S . ROTH:

20

THE COURT:

21

M S . ROTH:

Nothing

in her

He got up,

unusual.

What time of day was

it?

Midday, I believe.
One o'clock

p.m.

As I say, I mean, that's

22

what

it requires

23

what

the cause was, other

24

the medical

25

does

basically

is for the jury to speculate

about

than what's established

evidence, which

establish.

depend

I think

the autopsy

by

report

you just said and
decision.
started

that's why I issued

But as I looked

to think about

and

this thing, the autopsy

I think

THE COURT:

memorandum

at your withdrawal

conclude he had a heart attack,
M S . ROTH:

the

didn't

right?

it did, Your

Honor.

Well, I got the impression

that

everything was consistent with him having a heart
attack.

Maybe

I'm

M S . ROTH:
accident

stating

I think

is severe

that too

lightly.

it says contributory

arteriosclerotic

to the

cardiovascular

disease.
MR. LAURITZEN:
M S . ROTH:

I have that.

And that the certificate

which is issued by Dr. Gray, who is the
examiner, listed
contributing
immediate
multiple

as "other significant

cause given

conditions
to the

in part one," which is the

injuries, is the

arteriosclerosis.
that one of the things

we kind of get side-tracked

that

on is we're not saying he

at the time of the accident.

THE COURT:
M S . ROTH:
that.

medical

to the death but not related

Now, I think

was dead

of death,

Right.
And

Incapacitated.

I don't

think we need

I think what we have to establish

only evidence

to establish
is that the

that we have is that he had a heart

